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Abstract Tropical forest conservation in developing countries has repeatedly been
highlighted as a new element in international climate policy. However, no clear ideas
yet exist as to what shape such a conservation strategy might take. In the present
paper, we would like to make some observations to this end. It is shown how projects
in order to reduce CO2-emissions resulting from deforestation and degradation
(REDD) can be integrated into a system of tradable emission rights in an indus-
trialised country and which requirements ought to be fulﬁlled. Instruments are
emission credits and emission allowances. Driving actors interested in emission
rights through forest projects may be private investors or the rainforest state itself.
The efﬁciency of the system depends on a great extent on a binding reference path for
the tolerable emissions from deforestation, which has been agreed upon and adhered
to by the rainforest country by means of a forest law aimed at limiting deforestation.
Our considerations lead us to conclude that the national baseline approach with an
appropriate contribution by the rainforest country coupled with a decentralised
system with private investors seems the most viable option. Since additional burdens
are imposed on the rainforest country to some extent, a compromise could consist of
agreeing on a moderate deforestation path, which is harmonised with the beneﬁts
from the forest projects. Combining both programmes (offset credits and emission
allowances) is particularly attractive because all participants, and especially the
industrialised country, beneﬁt from it. The industrialised country can expand its
climate conservation programme without any additional costs to a certain degree.
Zusammenfassung Die Erhaltung der tropischen Wa ¨lder ist wiederholt als ein
neues Element der internationalen Klimaschutzpolitik hervorgehoben worden. Je-
doch gibt es bislang keine genaueren Vorstellungen, wie ein Schutzkonzept aus-
sehen ko ¨nnte. Dazu werden hier U ¨berlegungen angestellt. Untersucht wird, wie ein
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der Regenwa ¨lder einbeziehen kann und welche Anforderungen dafu ¨r gelten sollten.
Als Instrumente kommen Emissionsgutschriften und regula ¨re Emissionszertiﬁkate
in Betracht. Investoren ko ¨nnen Private oder das Regenwaldland selbst sein (de-
zentraler oder zentraler Ansatz). Wesentliche Bedingung fu ¨r die Wirksamkeit des
Systems ist, dass ein bindender nationaler Referenzpfad fu ¨r den tropischen Wald-
bestand vereinbart und durch Reform der Waldnutzungsrechte umgesetzt wird. Die
U ¨berlegungen laufen darauf hinaus, dass das nationale baseline-Konzept mit
angemessenem Eigenbeitrag des Regenwaldlandes und das dezentrale System mit
privaten Investoren am besten geeignet sind. Weil dem Regenwaldland mit den
eigenen klimapolitischen Anstrengungen zusa ¨tzliche Lasten aufgebu ¨rdet werden,
ko ¨nnte ein Kompromiss darin bestehen, fu ¨r sie einen moderaten Abbaupfad zu
vereinbaren, der mit den Vorteilen aus den zusa ¨tzlichen Waldprojekten abgestimmt
ist. Eine Kombination der beiden Programme, Emissionsgutschriften und regula ¨re
Emissionszertiﬁkate, erscheint besonders attraktiv, weil alle Beteiligten davon
Vorteile haben. Fu ¨r das Industrieland bietet sich die Chance, seinen Klimaschutz in
bestimmten Grenzen ohne Mehrkosten auszuweiten.
1 Introduction
Tropical forest conservation in developing countries has repeatedly been high-
lighted as a new element in international climate policy. There were also high hopes
for the UN Conference on Climate Change in Mexico last December. However, no
clear ideas yet exist as to what shape such a conservation strategy might take. In the
present paper, we would like to make some observations to this end. A variety of
legislative initiatives on climate conservation from the 2009/10 US Congress will
serve as our starting point. Even if the initiatives failed, they unanimously included
rainforest conservation as an integral part of climate policy and, for the ﬁrst time,
deﬁned concrete requirements for a conservation policy.
1
In this paper, we will focus on national policy: an industrialised country (the
United States) makes an arrangement with a rainforest country to promote projects
in order to reduce emissions resulting from deforestation and degradation (REDD)
and determines both a speciﬁc set of instruments and a number of conditions. The
regulations are integrated into a system of tradable emission allowances (cap-and-
trade), a policy approach which, as opposed to emission taxes and standards, is
considered particularly suitable for climate policy. The measures are based on the
‘do ut des’ principle—payment for services—meaning they differ from subsidy
regulations. These considerations can easily be applied to an international rainforest
policy for the industrialised world.
Current deforestations are so excessive that the potential for reducing and
eventually stopping them could drastically reduce CO2 emissions—and most likely
1 The following considerations essentially refer to the American Clean Energy and Security Act
(ACESA) from 2009 which passed through the House of Representatives by a narrow majority, but failed
in the Senate due to the Republicans’ opposition.
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world could get much closer to reaching its goal of limiting global warming to 2C
by 2050. According to estimates taking into account recent years, about 13–15% of
global CO2 emissions are due to deforestation, which is roughly equivalent to the
shares of industry, trafﬁc and farming, respectively.
2
2 The cap-and-trade approach
Greenhouse gases are intended to be limited to a ﬁxed absolute amount by way of a
restricted annual allocation of tradable emission allowances. Only those who own
allowances, as emitters within the system, are permitted to release the respective
amount of CO2 and other greenhouse gases. In the US, the introduction of a national
cap-and-trade system, partly based on the auctioning off of the allowances (roughly
18%), was planned for 2012 onwards. The system would provide two ways of taking
into account REDD activities:
2.1 Offset credits
CompaniesparticipatinginthesystemwouldbeallowedtooffsetaportionoftheirCO2
emissions by investing in activities outside the deﬁned system (e.g. carbon capture and
sequestration). They would receive credits allowing them to undertake the same
amount of emissions within the system area. The recognition of REDD projects in
developing countries would be new and, since the expected costs of these projects
would be comparatively low, the national economy could be relieved considerably.
Offset credits could be purchased both by emitters and third parties. For emitters, they
could replace preventive measures at home; other purchasers could sell them in
emissions trading. Because prices for allowances are decreasing, all emitters in the
system would beneﬁt from the lower costs. In case, the additional domestic emissions
are equal to the reduced rainforest emissions, a constant level of total global emissions
and an appropriately deﬁned national climate goal would be maintained. In return for
theagreedomissionofdeforestation,therainforestcountrywouldreceiveashareofthe
returns, which would not only cover the costs but also provide a surplus.
An additional climate effect could be achieved by deﬁning the exchange rate of
emission reductions in credits, not to 1:1, but, for instance, to 1.25:1 (cf. ACESA).
This allows for the pursuit of more ambitious climate goals. To this end, the
industrialised country must forgo a part of otherwise possible cost reductions, since
REDD projects are slightly more expensive for investors.
2.2 Emission allowances set aside for reduced deforestation
The complete amount of annual allocated emission allowances is not distributed to
the emitters, as some is reserved for investors engaging in REDD activities. In the
US model, individuals and organisations would only be eligible if they were not
2 Cf. Nobre (2010).
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123emitters, including international organisations. Because the purchasers would sell
their allowances on the US market, the allowances would eventually return there,
meaning that after an initial cut in the allocation, the total amount given to domestic
emitters would remain constant. So, the realisation of the domestic emission limit is
combined with an additional positive climate effect in the rainforest countries. In
this approach, unlike in the ﬁrst programme, the industrialised country would bear
additional costs for rainforest conservation. The burden would be carried by both
the emitters, who would now have to buy allowances which they previously
received free of charge, and the government, which would lose revenue by forgoing
part of the auctioned amount. The winners would be the investors and project
partners in the rainforest country.
The intention was that together, both conservation programmes were to bring
about a considerable expansion of US climate conservation beyond what could be
achieved domestically. Without these regulations, by 2020, emissions were
expected to be reduced to the approximate level of 1990. As for the ACESA, it
was estimated that both programmes would each lower this goal by around 6% by
2020, reaching minus 12% as compared to 1990.
3 The US industry would have been
substantially relieved from abatement costs as the offset programme would have
been dominant.
The offset credits and allowances for reduced deforestation ought to be fully
fungible. They should not carry with them any burdens from their realisation. The
owners should not be restricted in the use or sale of the authorised amount of
emission rights. All costs associated with a forest project would have to be carried
by the investor. As soon as emission rights were granted by the public administrator,
they should be valid indeﬁnitely, even if the forest project was to fail at a later point.
For an industrialised nation, this system runs the risk that more emission rights
would be assigned than emission reductions are created through forest activities.
This would have different consequences for the two instruments. For the offset
regulation (1:1 exchange), fewer emissions would be avoided than originally
planned. The domestic goal would be violated. With the emission allowances
programme, on the other hand, nothing would change for the emitters as a group.
The domestic emission limit would be adhered to. However, the supplementary
climate goal would not be met.
3 National deforestation emission baseline
Due to the global climate orientation, the reference point of the forest strategy is the
complete forest carbon stock of a partner country. Projects are intended to produce
an additional and permanent effect on the climate, as opposed to the development
path of deforestation that would otherwise occur. The current (annual) emission
reductions must be measurable and veriﬁable. To this end, the state of forests and
their carbon contents must be constantly recorded. According to experts, it is
currently possible to measure reductions in CO2 emissions from deforestation in
3 Cf. Larsen and Heilmayr (2009).
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statistical methods on the ground).
Projectsrefertoforestareaswhichstillexist,butwhosestockwillbeendangeredin
the future. The investor and the licensing authority do not know whether or not
deforestation would occur inthe absence of the project. The basis of the assessment is
uncertain, and manipulation by the original owners remains possible. A secure
reference point is required and is assumed by the national baseline for the annual CO2
emissions due to deforestation. This baseline determines the maximum permitted
deforestation emissions per period agreed upon between countries. Central to this is
the importance of preventing a country from setting an excessively high reference
emission quantity in order to receive funding for forest areas, which would have been
conserved in any case. Aiming for permanency also entails that the forest stocks
conserved during a particular period do not raise the baseline of a later period.
Some proponents of the rainforest policy suggest taking the business as usual
path of deforestation emissions as a reference point, using deforestation rates of the
past 5–10 years adjusted by the current state of politics. In this case, the country
would not have to change its politics much at all, and relatively vague, the approach
offers opportunities for manipulations. The US proposition, therefore, would set into
place a stricter standard. The permissible deforestation quantity would be
continually lowered over time until zero emission was reached after 20 years. This
annual decline of the emissions would induce both a high binding effect with regard
to the conservation strategy as well as involving the rainforest country in global
climate policy. It would require forest rights be reformed. Illegal forest clearings
would have to be stopped and legal deforestations limited. Instruments to
accomplish this could include deﬁning conservation areas, clarifying and restricting
individual deforestation rights, more effective controls of, and penalties against,
breaking the law, limiting government funding of logging as well as creating a
sustainable infrastructure and settlement policy.
In both approaches, it must be ensured that the additionality and permanency of
forest conservation not be undermined by counteracting reactions. So-called leakage
must be prevented. This refers to the risk that the previous owners might shift their
deforestation activities to other areas, that the current project owners might neglect
their forest areas and that the state itself might conduct or at least tolerate forest
degradations elsewhere. The very fact that this is possible is due to shortcomings in
existing forest law, because previous users of the rainforest who relocate to other
areas must be legally authorised to do so, and indeed are able to do so due to a lack
of controls and sanctions. This becomes impossible if other people and organisa-
tions own the rights to use the land in question and if their rights are effectively
protected. The same is true for leakage through the investor. Once his project is
authorised, he might be tempted to neglect the necessary upkeep and protection of
the land against exterior impacts, as this would result in cost savings for him. After
all, his commitment would be considered ‘permanent’. It is also conceivable that, at
a later date, an investor could intentionally carry out deforestations so as to acquire
further revenue in addition to the gains from the emission rights. In such cases,
forest law could also offer protection: once the authorised right of use is speciﬁed
for the conservation of a forest area, its destruction would be illegal and forbidden.
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completely unrealistic to believe that a ﬁnal path valid ‘for all time’ could be
determined. The planning technique of sliding planning seems an obvious choice. In
this approach, the overall planning period is predeﬁned (i.e. 10–15 years). After
each completed reference year of planning, a new year is added on to the end. The
meanwhile improved level of knowledge allows for updating all planning data.
4 Allocation of emission credits and emission allowances
The rainforest area is expected to receive emission rights to the same extent that
actual emissions due to deforestation fall below the baseline. The macro-difference
is seen as an indicator of the conservation projects authorised during the respective
period. The difference must exceed a certain size in order to be measurable in the
course of recording forest carbon stocks. Therefore, only bigger forest projects
would be eligible for this type of policy (which would also make leakage more
difﬁcult).
The question is how to proceed if the macro-balance shows lower emission
reductions than the sum of the individual project effects. In this case, other
inﬂuences would have increased the actual emissions. What springs to mind are a
lack of political enforcement, inaccurate measurements and natural impacts
(droughts, ﬁres, storms, ﬂooding and tree diseases). One could adjust the macro-
balance for these causes and set emissions lower than their actual quantity. In case
of a lack of enforcement, however, this appears not to be the right way because too
many emission rights would be distributed. The individual effects ought to be
discounted. This type of discounting may seem unfair, as it means that the investors
have to carry the burden of the government’s lack of enforcement; however, this
consequence is an integral part of the system. In the case of forest degradation
through natural forces, a new baseline should be chosen, since these effects are not
related to the conservation policy. The damage would have occurred in any case and
would certainly have caused the baseline to be raised by the partner states if the
events could have been foreseen.
Time is another important aspect regarding the allocation of emission rights. The
macro-balance can only be determined at the end of a one-year period, as forest
carbon stocks are compared at the beginning and end of the period. Forest projects
are, therefore, only authorised after, and not during, a period. This has important
consequences: (1) It takes some time for investors to plan a project, and since there
is no knowing beforehand to what extent their project will be authorised, they are
faced with a particular time-related planning risk. They do not know if and to what
extent discounting will occur. (2) Counteracting emission effects will occur later,
after an activity has been authorised. Therefore, the authorisation of current projects
is dependent upon the extent to which leakage was caused by prior projects. (3) The
industrialised country will consider the macro-balance of a completed year and not
the possible future effects when deciding about individual projects. There is no
control mechanism for holding responsible a project operator who allows his forest
area to degrade later. Liability for default is not possible.
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project-related baseline. This way, one would make do with a claim of additionality
in the vicinity of forest activities. Any potential lack of enforcement or leakage
outside of the area in question would not be recorded. The rainforest country would
not be obliged to take legal action.
4
5 Private investors as actors
Driving actors are private investors interested in forest projects in order to gain
ﬁnancial beneﬁts. They must purchase the user right of forest areas, which would
otherwise be destroyed from those who currently are entitled (nations, states, local
communities, individuals and private ﬁrms).
5 Since this relates to the prevention of
CO2 emissions, the user rights refer to the preservation of a forest stock rather than
to other uses, such as the utilisation of the gene potential. The forest stocks must be
preserved ‘indeﬁnitely’. For investors, engaging in a REDD activity this means a
long-term commitment, which can last more than 100 years. And, they must be
aware of the fact that any given project only triggers a one-time CO2 saving effect.
However, climate policy also demands from them a permanent periodical reduction
in emissions. If they want to meet these requirements by means of the conservation
strategy, they will have to frequently engage in REDD activities. This is
substantially different from the avoidance of industrial emissions, which are based
on permanently reducing emissions over a longer time period by means of a single
new technology.
Investors require legal certainty with regard to their commitment. It is a fact that
the destruction of forests is essentially a consequence of insufﬁciently deﬁned and
controlled land use rights. Forest areas whose ownership is unclear and which are
illegally deforested cannot be subject to acquisitions. In order to integrate the
endangered areas into the conservation policy, the necessary legal bases and control
conditions must ﬁrst be created.
6 The most important driving forces behind the
destruction of tropical rainforest areas are agriculture, cattle breeding and logging
conducted by large businesses, small-holder farming as well as ﬁrewood procure-
ment and public infrastructure projects. At least 50% of rainforest destruction is due
4 The US approach considers a subnational baseline to be an exception (for a federal state, a province or a
region) if a partner country presently does not yet meet the requirements but is in a transition period to
introduce the national baseline politics.
5 In The End of the Hinterland: Forest, Conﬂict and Climate Change (The Rights and Resources
Initiative, Washington, D.C., 2009–2010) the following forms of ownership are distinguished:
Administration by the government (A), Ownership of local communities and the indigenous population
(B), Utilization determined by communities and the indigenous population (C), Ownership of individuals
and companies. The following ownership structures were observed for 85% of the recorded rainforests in
2008: Africa 97.9% A; Asia 67.8% A, 26.5% B?C, 5.7% D; Latin America 36.1% A, 56.5 B?C, 7.3% D.
6 The main reasons for why little has been done so far to stop illegal deforestation are: Illegal
deforestation relieves governments from problems of limited land availability due to a fast growing
population; the importance of foreign currency revenue; the priority of economic growth interests;
ignorance about the true extend of the deforestations due to infrequent forest stock taking; a lack of
political enforcement against large-scale land owners and corruption.
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Even in places where the government is neither the owner nor administrator, it will
often be involved in negotiations because it is jointly responsible for creating new
living conditions for the previous users (small farmers, tenants, employees of large
companies, etc.) and because, beyond the personal beneﬁt of the owner, previous
uses are of public interest (foreign exchange, licensing and tax revenues, etc.).
Forest conservation is considered attractive by industrialised countries and their
investors because this type of emission avoidance is seen as particularly inexpensive
compared to limiting emissions domestically, according to the general opinion.
However, in the context of a concrete conservation policy system, the respective
requirements regarding forest projects need to be taken into account. For the
investors, this situation is not at all easy:
Investors must look for eligible suppliers and forest areas and must be convinced
that the users are the entitled parties and their rights are sufﬁciently protected. The
search is made difﬁcult by the fact that at the present time, there are no organised
markets for conservation projects.
The compensation for the previous owners waiving their rights of use is usually
calculated in terms of opportunity costs. Thus, it is assumed that previous owners
are integrated into the market economy and can seamlessly switch their source of
income. The evaluation is carried out according to the discounted forgone yields
from foregoing clearings and loggings.
7 This approach is feasible for large
companies in the agricultural and timber industries. Such companies, however, will
not at all be satisﬁed with the capitalised values of the waivers of foregoing yields,
but will demand a higher price.
Forests damaged by small farmers and local communities are a different matter.
8
In order to achieve equivalent yields to the previous free use of the forests, they
must incur costs, which are substantially higher than the previous yields. They are
dependent upon modern methods of agriculture (e.g. using more efﬁcient seeds,
fertilisers and plant protection agents as well as access to loans and agricultural
services), alternative fuels, the development of markets for products from
sustainable cultivation (e.g. fruit, oils, resins) and employment opportunities in
cities. For small farmers, all of this is unaffordable. Furthermore, these groups of
people do not merely want to be compensated, but want to improve their situation,
as the US model explicitly demands: local village communities and concerned
individuals must be involved as stakeholders in the planning and execution of
conservation projects and participate in the gains from the emission credits and
allowances in a fair manner. If purchase decisions are made over the heads of
village communities and their means of subsistence is taken away from them, they
are left with no choice but to resort to other areas. In order to be able to deal with all
the consequences of waiving their right of use, the small farmers need the
government’s support. For the rainforest country, the question thus arises as to
7 According to the Stern Review (The Economics of Climate Change, http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk,
2006, p 540) direct costs for agriculture, including logging, generally do not exceed $5 per tonne of CO2.
For industrialised countries, however, market prices for emission rights are estimated about at least $15
per tonne of CO2—depending on the aspiration level for future climate conservation politics.
8 Cf. Gregersen (2010).
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itself and which costs ought to be borne by the investors.
Project operators must deal with costs arising from the obligation to permanently
sustain the forest area and protect it against destructive forces. They must consent to
permanently conserving the forest stock in accordance with the generally accepted
practices of sustainable forestry including the protection of original ecosystems and
indigenous populations as well as holding off foreign biological inﬂuences. On the
other hand, they might receive yields from sustainable forestry.
Investors must be prepared for discounting of the emission reductions as
emission rights, without knowing the extent of it. This reduces the sales revenue
from the credits and allowances and increases the investment risk. The uncertainty
might be dispelled if a ﬁxed standardised discount rate was determined for a given
partner country; this, however, would devalue the macro concept of the baseline
policy itself.
To summarise: the investors’ costs might be substantially higher than the
opportunity costs for a project. Any references in current specialist literature
indicating very low costs are of little help to investors interested in a speciﬁc project
in a particular rainforest with a concrete conservation policy system. Rainforest
conservation brings with it much higher risks than industrial prevention techniques
(uncertainties in the authorisation process, an extensive long-term planning horizon,
one-time climate effects of forest projects and an uncertain state of negotiations:
who will be the investor’s partner and who will have what say during negotiations?
Who will bear the social and infrastructural costs?).
6 The rainforest country as investor of REDD projects
According to another approach put forward by rainforest countries, they would
decide themselves whether to maintain forest projects. Private investors would not
be part of the plan.
9 As far as the basic design of this centralistic approach is
concerned, it is not unlike the decentralised model discussed previously. A national
baseline for deforestation emissions would be set and compared to the actual
emissions of 1 year. If the actual emissions were to fall below that quantity, the
difference would be remunerated at a price per tonne of CO2. An agreement would
be made for the price to be paid out in cash or as emission allowances for the
industrialised country. The payment would be made as soon as the service had been
rendered, i.e., when the macro-balance was deﬁnite. The emission rights could come
as credits or allowances. This approach allows for an innovation: if the actual
emissions were to exceed the baseline during a particular period—due to special
economic circumstances, a lack of enforcement or exogenous inﬂuences— excess
emissions would be carried forward to the subsequent periods and settled against
emission reductions.
9 Cf. Federal Republic of Brazil, Brazilian Perspective on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation, 20
February 2007; Coalition of Rainforest Nations, Submission of Views: Reducing Emissions from
Deforestation in Developing Countries: Approaches to Stimulate Action, San Jose `, Costa Rica, January
30, 2007.
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evaluation and authorisation of single projects would be dropped. This way, the
rainforest country would then receive more room for the design of adaptation
measures. It would no longer be necessary to ensure a secure legal situation and to
conducttherespectivereformaswellascontrolsnecessaryforcreatinglegalcertainty
for private investors. However, a new problem would simultaneously arise. It would
become increasingly difﬁcult to negotiate a binding baseline between the contractual
countries. In this system, the government of the rainforest country would make
decisions both about the level of emission limits and the amount of additional forest
activities. The higher the baseline value, the more supplementary services it could
account for and request to have ﬁnanced by the industrialised country. Furthermore,
the government would be the recipient of remunerations from the emission rights in
such a way that it could freely dispose of the revenue. These circumstances would
promote the tendency to set an excessive baseline. It is difﬁcult for the industrialised
country to uncover manipulations in this area. In the decentralised system, however,
the two areas of decision making would be separated.
If a reasonable baseline exists, there is increased ﬁnancial pressure on the
rainforest country to comply with and take the necessary measures for limiting the
forest, for a lack of enforcement tends to manifest itself in lower public revenues.
The government itself directly becomes the injured party. The same applies to cases
in which conserved forest stocks are destroyed later on and the criterion of
permanency is thereby breached. In the decentralised system, however, the private
investors are not capable of exerting pressure on policy execution. Fulﬁlling the
carry-forward rule also tends to have a positive effect on compliance: if an
infringement of the baseline could occur within a current period, the respective
emission excesses would lower the revenues, which could be achieved later, thus
creating an incentive to put more effort into complying with the baseline. Such a
macro penalty rule would not be applicable within the system of the decentralised
US model. There, the political concept assumes a priori that actual emissions would
regularly fall below the baseline.
The decentralised model turns negative when corruption poses a problem in the
politics of the rainforest country. Because revenues from conservation programmes
go directly to the government, they are easily accessed by corrupt politicians and civil
servants. Funds that were intended for measures associated with the conservation of
rainforests (legal reform, controls, measurements), for the compensation of the local
populations concerned and for the promotion of the general economic development,
would be diverted.
7 How to proceed?
The global climate impact of a forest conservation programme depends to a great
extent on a binding reference path for tolerable emissions from deforestation, which
has been agreed upon and adhered to by the rainforest country by means of a forest
law aimed at limiting deforestation. To this end, the national baseline approach with
an appropriate contribution by the rainforest country coupled with a decentralised
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burdens are imposed on the rainforest countries to some extent, a compromise could
consist of agreeing on a moderate deforestation path, which is harmonised with the
beneﬁts from the forest projects. A reliable continuous measurement of the national
forest stock is indispensible.
Combining both programmes (offset credits and emission allowances) is
particularly attractive because all participants, and especially the industrialised
country, beneﬁt from it. The industrialised country can expand its climate
conservation programme without any additional costs to a certain degree.
The conservation strategy holds risks for all parties involved. The industrialised
country must reckon with releasing too many emission allowances and thereby
missing its climate goal. Investors must thoroughly consider if and which forest
projects will be beneﬁcial to them compared with domestic avoidance techniques
with regard to the potentially complex cost and risk conditions. Literature
commonly suggests that avoidance costs for tropical rainforest projects in
developing countries are very low, thus simplifying the matter too much. For the
rainforest country, there is uncertainty as to whether it will be in the position to bear
the costs and solve the socioeconomic conﬂicts which come with a baseline policy,
including a reform of forest use rights, setting up an effective control system,
carrying out continuous measuring of the forests’ carbon stocks and providing new
sources of income for the previous forest users.
The question arises to what extent a rainforest country would need support with
regard to its technical and institutional capacity. The US approach neglects this
problem by demanding that agreements only be made with countries, which are
already economically and institutionally capable of conducting an efﬁcient baseline
policy. A partner country offering these qualities would have proven in the past that
it was able to solve conﬂicts of interest and that it had carried costs which no longer
play a role after an agreement has been reached. Other types of costs would be new
and additional, because special requirements of a forest conservation agreement
must be met. There are likely only few countries capable of participating of their
own accord in this programme anytime soon. One such candidate could be Brazil,
which not only has the largest share in the destruction and damage of the global
rainforest stock but also runs a satellite surveillance system for the rainforest and
has introduced stricter controls and protection laws over recent years.
In the case of success, the conservation concept described previously could
promote an advance in the international climate protection efforts in a twofold
manner: ﬁrst, by reducing current deforestation as an independent goal of the
rainforest countries and second, by additional projects of private (and public)
investors from abroad. The requirements and conditions would need to be laid down
in an agreement so that all parties involved would beneﬁt from it while national
climate protection goals would more or less be reached. The developing countries,
however, are not yet willing to legally commit to speciﬁc national emission limits;
rather, they view their consent merely as political self-commitment. This causes
uncertainties for the industrialised nations. But, unlike the general discussion about
a new international climate agreement succeeding the Kyoto Protocol, rainforest
programmes are faced with a special situation: the beneﬁts from an agreement
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commitments and the agreement is dissolved. This indirect penalty mechanism
strengthens the trust of the industrialised countries in the contractual ﬁdelity of the
partner country.
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